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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 












FAIR COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT 






ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
 
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH CIRCUIT 
__________________________________ 
 






The opinions of the District and Appeals Courts 




The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010.  (R. at 16).  Petitioner 
filed his petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010.  (R. at 17).  This Court granted 
the petition on October 7, 2010.  (R. at 18).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 
1254(1) (2000).  A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from them are reviewed for clear error.  Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the night of September 23, 2008, Fair County police officer John Marlin 
(“Marlin”) pulled over Beau Radley (“Radley”) for drunk driving.  (R. at 11).  After 
refusing to take a breathalyzer test, Radley was arrested by Marlin and driven to the Fair 
County Police Station.  (R. at 11-12).  Radley asserts no use of excessive force claim 
against Marlin.  (R. at 11).  
Upon reaching the Fair County Police Station, Radley’s custody was transferred to 
Fair County police officer Arthur Goode (“Goode”).  (R. at 11-12).  Goode removed 
Radley’s handcuffs and proceeded with the booking process.  (R. at 12).  
Once booking was complete, Goode replaced Radley’s handcuffs, but Radley 
claimed that the handcuffs were too tight.  (R. at 12).  Marlin had re-entered the booking 
room upon completion of the booking process, and subsequently loosened Radley’s 
handcuffs.  (R. at 12).  
Goode then walked Radley to a holding cell where the two became involved in an 
altercation, during which the handcuffed Radley was pushed to the ground and suffered a 
cut lip.  (R. at 12).  This event led to Radley’s filing of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against 
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Goode and the Fair County Police Department for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
violations.  (R. at 12).  
Radley’s original 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims were filed February 1, 2009.  (R. at 12).  
Goode and the Fair County Police Department filed a motion to dismiss on March 12, 
2009, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair granted the 
motion to dismiss Radley’s Fourth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  (R. at 13); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On March 15, 2010, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.  (R. at 16).  On May 15, 2010, Radley filed petition for certiorari, and on 
October 7, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the petition to review 
two questions: 1) Whether the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force 
extends beyond initial seizure; and 2) If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing 
seizure to the Fourth Amendment protection against the use of excessive force, to what 
point beyond initial seizure should that protection extend?  (R. at 17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I 
 In cases of excessive force by a state actor, the Fourth Amendment protects 
arrestees during seizure, the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees after 
seizure and before conviction, and the Eighth Amendment protects inmates after they 
have been convicted and incarcerated.  However, the circuit courts are split on the issue 
of how long the Fourth Amendment protection should apply post-arrest (or, initial 
seizure) in cases of excessive force.  But, there is nothing in the text of the Fourth 
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Amendment that indicates that “seizure” is anything more than a single act, and this 
Court has declined to decide where Fourth Amendment protection ends, or more 
importantly, to decide that Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond initial seizure.  
To resolve the circuit split, the Court should establish a “bright line” rule ceasing Fourth 
Amendment protection against excessive force at the conclusion of the initial seizure.       
II 
 Even if this Court were to allow Fourth Amendment protection against excessive 
force to extend beyond initial seizure, the protection should end when the custody of the 
arrestee is relinquished by the arresting officer or officers.  Of the circuit courts that have 
adopted the “continuing seizure” doctrine applying Fourth Amendment protection against 
excessive force past the point of initial seizure, the majority have held that Fourth 
Amendment protection ends when the arrestee is released from the custody of the 
arresting officer or officers, or at the latest when the arrestee has completed the booking 
process.  Therefore, if this Court were to allow Fourth Amendment protection to extend 
beyond initial seizure, the protection should end when the detainee is no longer in 
custody of the arresting officer or officers, or, at maximum, with the completion of the 
booking process.      
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
state and local governments from depriving citizens of life, liberty, and property without 
due process of law.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Congress has enacted legislation to 
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enable persons that have been deprived of their civil rights to bring a federal action 
against the state actor that caused the harm. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  However, the 
statute itself is merely the vehicle for enforcement, and the constitutional right infringed 
must be asserted and proven to have been violated.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
394 (1989).   
The Supreme Court in Graham explicitly declined to determine where Fourth 
Amendment protection ends, and Fourteenth Amendment protection begins, post-initial 
seizure.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10.  The Graham Court also upheld the idea that the 
Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard should be used to review cases 
of excessive force during the course of arrest.  Id. at 1867-68.  Yet, some circuits have 
adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment protection continues to apply post-seizure, 
resulting in a circuit court split.  See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 
1997).  Generally said, assertion of a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation 
demands that the act done “shocks the conscience.”  Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).  Plaintiffs pursuing an action under section 
1983 commonly allege a violation of Fourth Amendment rights over Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, as an “objective reasonableness” violation of the Fourth Amendment 
is not as difficult to prove as is a “shocks the conscience” violation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Graham, 490 U.S. 386.  Though a pretrial detainee exposed to 
excessive force should be constitutionally protected, the protection should not pose a 
hindrance to the successful administration of law enforcement.  Opening-up nearly every 
action towards a pretrial detainee by a state actor to “objective reasonableness” review 
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places an undue burden on the judicial system; thus, Fourth Amendment protection 
against excessive force should aptly cease with the completion of the initial seizure.    
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE SHOULD 
END WHEN THE INITIAL SEIZURE IS COMPLETE. 
 
A.  “Seizure” is a single act. 
The Fourth Amendment only applies to the arrest and not the detaining after an 
arrest, as seizure constitutes nothing more than a singular act.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 163 
(quoting California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991)).  Three circuit courts strongly 
support this definition of “seizure.”  See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 
1996); Riley, 115 F.3d at 1159; and Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993).  
Aside from viewing the text of the Fourth Amendment to decide where its protection 
should end, these decisions provide the best-reasoned analyses of why the Amendment’s 
protection against excessive force should end with the conclusion of initial seizure.    
In Cottrell, the detainee was arrested and died en route to the police station post-
initial seizure by “positional asphyxia.”  Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1483.  Concededly, the 
opinion in Cottrell was more focused on issues concerned with interlocutory jurisdiction; 
however, the court discussed excessive force and how it should be judged by 
constitutional amendment, and indicated that Fourth Amendment protection applied to 
excessive force during the course of arrest and no further.  Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1492.  If 
the arrestee had died during the course of arrest, or, perhaps before the police car set out 
for the police station, the “objective reasonableness” standard could have applied.  
However, Cottrell shows that, even when the alleged wrong only remotely qualifies 
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under excessive force, the Fourth Amendment protection should not apply post-arrest.  
Id.              
 Cases more similar in kind to that at bar also demand that Fourth Amendment 
protection be refused post-initial seizure. Riley, 115 F.3d at 1161-62.  In Riley, the 
pretrial detainee had been arrested by one officer, transported to the police station by 
another officer, but again released into the custody of the arresting officer (and another 
officer), who took him to another county and subjected him to an alleged excessive force.  
Id.  Similar to Radley’s facts, the events in Riley took place at a location far removed 
from the site of the initial seizure.  Id. at 1161.  The Riley court goes further to explain 
that the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper tool to adjudge acts of excessive force 
against pretrial detainees, that courts should determine if the excessive force was meant 
to “punish” the pretrial detainee, and that this contention is supported by this Court’s 
precedent.  Id. at 1162 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).  Perhaps most 
importantly, the court acknowledged that arrest and detention are two separate acts 
worthy of two separate standards for adjudication.  Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103 (1975)).     
The Fifth Circuit was faced with a set of facts that could be resolved with a bright-
line rule ending Fourth Amendment protection at the conclusion of initial seizure.  See 
Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993).  In Valencia, the arresting officer of 
the detainee had become the Chief Deputy of the county jail after Valencia’s arrest, and 
had subjected Valencia to excessive force three weeks after he was incarcerated in the 
jail.  Id. at 1442.  The problems in this case are twofold and show the difficulty posed by 
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the absence of a clear rule establishing a cutoff for Fourth Amendment protection.  First, 
different jurisdictions have different time periods between initial seizure and formal 
arraignment.  Id.  Second, that it is possible, as in this case, that the detainee could be 
subjected to excessive force by the arresting officer, but the force could take place well 
beyond the point of initial seizure, and after the arresting officer has relinquished, then 
regained, custody.  Id.  The court, through a succinct and rational discussion, held that 
Fourth Amendment protection could not apply after arrest (initial seizure) has been 
completed.  Id. at 1443-44.  In its own words the court opined that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard to review cases of excessive 
force occurring against pretrial detainees.  Id. at 1445.   
B. Those Circuits that have held in favor of “continuing seizure” have done so 
with faulty logic.  
 
At least two circuit courts have held that a doctrine of “continuing seizure” is a 
proper extension of Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force.  See Wilson v. 
Spain, 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000) and Barrie v. Grand County, 119 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 
1997).  However, their reason for doing so seems unfounded and generally incorrect.   
The Wilson court was presented with a set of facts involving an officer’s 
accidental “knocking out” of a pretrial detainee in a holding cell just subsequent to the 
booking process.  Wilson, 209 F.3d at 714.  The court based its decision on prior 
precedent in the circuit.  Id. at 715-16.  The court acknowledges that the detainee would 
be unable to win a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment standard if he was unable to 
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win under the Fourth Amendment; however, the court does little to explain why applying 
the Fourth Amendment is proper or legally justified.  Id. at 716.   
In Barrie, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the issue of a pretrial detainee’s 
suicide.  Barrie, 119 F.3d at 863.  Although the court held that the Fourth Amendment 
was applicable in this case to pretrial detainees, the case had nothing to do with excessive 
force, and the opinion was primarily focused on conditions of confinement rather than 
any claim of excessive force.  See id. at 863-68. 
The proper constitutional protection afforded to victims of excessive force has 
been, on occasion, improperly analyzed because the major concerns of the courts dealt 
with other issues, or was only cursorily reviewed because the facts of the case didn’t 
warrant a formal analysis of what Amendment to apply.  When the major issue of a case 
has been what constitutional protection to apply concerning excessive force, great care 
has been taken to analyze the factors that influence the timing of certain law enforcement 
events and the pitfalls of applying the incorrect constitutional protection.  For those cases, 
the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force has ceased with the conclusion 
of the initial seizure.     
II. IF THIS COURT WERE TO ADOPT A RULE OF “CONTINUING SEIZURE” 
IN CASES OF EXCESSIVE FORCE, FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
SHOULD END WITH THE RELINQUISHMENT OF CUSTODY BY THE 
ARRESTING OFFICER OR OFFICERS. 
 
A. Even if this Court were to allow the Fourth Amendment protection 
against excessive force to extend beyond initial seizure, the 
protection should end when custody of the arrestee has been 




Of the circuits that have adopted the “continuing seizure” doctrine, many have 
been reluctant to extend the protection to pretrial detainees subjected to excessive force 
once the detainee has left the custody of the arresting officer or officers.  See Torres v. 
City of Madeira, 524 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th 
Cir. 1988); and Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1989).  If this Court were to 
also adopt the “continuing seizure” doctrine, the decisions of these circuits should be the 
guide in determining where Fourth Amendment protection should end.  
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Torres was supported by Ninth Circuit precedent 
and a broadening of this Court’s opinions.  Torres, 524 F.3d at 1056.  A seizure continues 
while the detainee remains in the custody of the arresting officers.  Id. (quoting Robins v. 
Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985)).  Fourth Amendment protection continues to 
apply when the detainee is in the custody of the arresting officer.  Id. (quoting Fontana v. 
Haskin, 262 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2001)).  In the case of Torres, the excessive force 
concerned a mistake on the part of the officer in drawing her pistol rather than her Taser; 
however, the Fourth Amendment was held to be the correct standard of analysis since the 
detainee was still, by the court’s analysis, seized.  Id. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 
U.S. 79 (1987) and Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971)).  The Torres decision does 
not necessarily negate that initial seizure is a single act, it merely shows that the act of 
initial seizure can take several moments in time to complete.  Id.  From this perspective a 
“continuing seizure” analysis is appropriate, and deserving of Fourth Amendment 
protection.    
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In McDowell, the court based its decision to apply the Fourth Amendment based 
on pre-Graham Supreme Court precedent.  McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1305 (citing 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (where a suspect had fled from arrest and was 
shot by a police officer)).  The action was held to be unreasonable, and thus adjudged by 
the Fourth Amendment standard.  Id.  However, the court acknowledged that there was a 
dispute as to which Amendment, the Fourth or Fourteenth, should apply.  Id. at 1306.  
The case does not suggest that Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force 
should extend to detainees post-initial seizure, but that apprehending a fleeing suspect 
was actually part of initial seizure.  Id. at 1305.   
Like the facts of the case at bar, the basis for the excessive force complaint in 
Powell occurred at the police station and after the booking process was complete.  
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1041.  However, the detainee was subjected to the excessive force, 
unlike in Radley’s case, at the hands of the arresting officer (and several other officers).  
Id.  The Powell court went into some discussion about the holding of Graham and its 
decline to determine where Fourth Amendment protection ends, but ultimately based its 
determination to use the Fourth Amendment to guide its decision on a previous Second 
Circuit case.  Id. at 1044 (citing Calamia v. City of New York, 879 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 
1989) (Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force applied to detainee that was 
handcuffed and left for hours on the floor of his home)).  Though the Fourth Amendment 
should not be applied post-initial seizure, and the reason for applying the Fourth 
Amendment to the facts of the Powell case is an extension of the rule, the Powell 
11 
 
decision at least draws the line of application to those detainees that remain in the 
custody of the arresting officer or officers.    
B. Some Circuits hold that Fourth Amendment protection should apply up to 
formal arraignment; however, the reasons for doing so lack legal merit. 
 
The primary problem with applying the Fourth Amendment up to arraignment is 
that certain factors could prevent the detainee from promptly being arraigned.  This could 
be, for instance, due to an extended hospital stay to treat wounds suffered during an arrest 
or some incident immediately subsequent to initial seizure.  The question, then, is should 
a detainee that has left the custody of the arresting officer for a situation such as this 
resume the Fourth Amendment protection once he or she is put back in the custody of the 
arresting officer or another officer of the law?   
Furthermore, it is likely that some jurisdictions will differ in the statutorily 
prescribed time before subjection to formal arraignment.  In Radley’s case, there is no 
statutory provision that dictates the latest a detainee must be taken for arraignment.  DM 
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.07  (West 2010).  Thus, if this Court were to adopt a rule 
allowing the Fourth Amendment to apply up to arraignment, just as much ambiguity of 
application would continue as is present now, rather an establishment of a “bright line” 
holding to cease the application of the protection upon completion of initial seizure or 
when the detainee is passed from the custody of the arresting officer or officers.   
Looking first to Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth 
Circuit noted it was confronted with an “analytical snarl” regarding what Amendment, 
the Fourth or Fourteenth, should apply.  Austin, 945 F.2d at 1158.  The Tenth Circuit 
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acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment applies during arrest, but grappled with the 
idea that Fourth Amendment should apply post-initial seizure.  Id. at 1159 (citing 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n. 10).  The court ultimately reached its decision to use the 
Fourth Amendment up to formal arraignment.  Id. at 1162.  However, it did so after citing 
a series of authority from other jurisdictions that do not support the idea.  Id. at 1159.  
Later discussing that the Fourth Amendment governs initial arrest, due process covers 
excessive force after initial arrest.  Id. at 1162.  Thus, the primary reason for applying the 
Fourth Amendment up to arraignment is to cover the reasonableness of the pre-
arraignment detention.  Id. at 1162-63.   
Returning to the decision of Barrie, the court held that Fourth Amendment 
protection should extend up until formal arraignment.  Barrie, 119 F.3d at 869-70.  
Barrie concerned a detainee that had been arrested without a warrant and subsequently 
committed suicide while awaiting arraignment in a jail’s “drunk tank.”  Id. at 863-64.  
The court distinguished its case from that of Austin since it involved a jail suicide, and 
not excessive force.  Id. at 866.  (citing Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th 
Cir. 1991)).  Therefore, Barrie would also be distinguished from the case at bar.  
Ultimately, the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper amendment to 
address issues of “deliberate indifference” towards pretrial detainees.  Id. at 868-69.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment is the proper standard to judge “deliberate indifference” in cases 
such as this, but by that rationale the Fourteenth Amendment would also provide the 
proper test to view “excessive force.”  One civil rights infraction (“deliberate 
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indifference”) is merely the mirror image of the other civil rights infraction (“excessive 
force”) and is no less of an infraction than the other.   
In Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that the 
Fourth Amendment applies up through probable cause hearings.  Id. at 866.  However, 
the court held this by extending its earlier holdings applying Fourth Amendment 
protection up through the booking process.  Id.  Even the facts of the case don’t warrant 
the extension, as the excessive force occurred during the booking process, and did not 
present the court with a fact situation showing the need for the Fourth Amendment 
protection to extend to probable cause hearings.  Id. at 867.  
C. At least two Circuits have refused to decide where Fourth Amendment 
protection against excessive force ends, applying a case-by-case rule, 
which should be rejected. 
 
Both the Third and Eighth Circuits have not indicated where exactly Fourth 
Amendment protection against excessive force should end post-initial seizure.  See 
United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 1997), and Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 
713 (8th Cir. 2000).  The two Circuits essentially turn to the facts of each case presented 
to determine if Fourth Amendment protection applies.  Though this idea is presented as a 
realistic approach to solving problems, it complicates how cases should be viewed and 
ensures that efficient and economical justice is missed.   
In Johnstone, a police officer was accused of excessive force against several 
detainees.  Johnstone, 107 F.3d at 202-03.  In the excessive force counts discussed by the 
court, all action had been taken after the detainees were in handcuffs, and thus after the 
arrests of the detainees and not at initial seizure.  Id. at 204.  However, rather than 
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applying the “continuing seizure” doctrine, the court stated that they would not decide 
where seizure ends and pretrial detention begins.  Id.   
The Wilson court faced the question of what Amendment to apply, but essentially 
focused its opinion on the facts of the case and the remote circumstances that brought the 
case to bar.  See Wilson, 209 F.3d 713.  In Wilson, the detainee had been arrested, 
booked, and accidentally knocked unconscious by the arresting officer when he attempted 
to enter the holding cell and bring the detainee to order.  Id. at 714.  At most, the 
“arresting officer” rule could apply, but not a holding of the Fourth Amendment 
applicable up until formal arraignment.  
CONCLUSION  
 The Circuit courts are split as to how long to apply Fourth Amendment protection 
of pretrial detainees in cases of excessive force, where the act occurs post-initial seizure.  
And, though state laws can and should be able to vary under our form of government, 
Congress enacted legislation to allow those subjected to excessive force by government 
officials to pursue a remedy in federal court.  This fact in of itself should be compelling 
for the Court to prescribe a bright line standard as to when, and when not, the Fourth 
Amendment should apply.  
 In viewing the issue from the perspective of the text of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and furthermore from well-reasoned Circuit decisions that have held that 
the Fourth Amendment should cease to apply once initial seizure is complete, it is a 
stretch to allow the Fourth Amendment to extend past “seizure,” when seizure has been 
shown to be a single act.  Those subjected to excessive force should certainly be 
15 
 
protected under the Constitution; however, ample protection exists under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and no logical reason exists to broaden the scope past what the 
Amendments were originally intended to accomplish.  In conflicting decisions, the 
concept of continuum still exists:  initial seizure leads to pretrial detention leads to formal 
arraignment leads to conviction.  The Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” 
standard protects against excessive force during the initial seizure, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “shocks the conscience” standard protects against excessive force during 
the pretrial detention period, and the Eighth Amendment protection against “cruel and 
unusual punishment” exists to protect the convicted from excessive force.   
 If, however, the Court were to look to the ambiguous situations occasionally 
encountered during arrest and adopt a “continuing seizure” rule, the Fourth Amendment 
protection against excessive force should at least end when the arresting officer or 
officers relinquishes custody of the arrestee.  Holding otherwise would invariably flood 
the courts with assertions of Fourth Amendment violations, and though the detainees 
would be further protected, state officers would be unduly hindered in their 
responsibilities.  Creating avenues of protection for some should not come at the 
unreasonable expense of others.   
 Finally, if the Court were to broaden the rule and allow Fourth Amendment 
protection to extend past initial seizure, and past the relinquishment of custody from the 
arresting officer or officers, the protection should not extend past the completion of the 
booking process.  Though timing between arrest and booking can be influenced by a 
number of factors, the majority of booking processes occur in a reasonable time after the 
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initial seizure has concluded.  Formal arraignment, on the other hand, can vary greatly 
between jurisdictions.  Thus, holding Fourth Amendment to apply up until formal 






For the reasons stated above, Respondents pray that this Court affirm the decision of 
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII 





U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.  
